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ABSTRACT 
In Integrated Deterministic and Probabilistic Safety Analysis (IDPSA), safe scenarios and Prime 
Implicants (PIs), i.e., minimum combinations of failure events that are capable of leading the system 
into a fault state are generated by simulation. Post-processing is needed to extract relevant information 
from these scenarios. In this paper, we propose a novel post-processing method which resorts to a 
risk-based clustering method for identifying Near Misses among the safe scenarios, i.e., combinations 
of failure events that lead the system to a quasi-fault state, a condition close to accident. This is 
important because the possibility of recovering these combinations of failures within a tolerable grace 
time allows avoiding deviations to accident and, thus, reducing the downtime (and the risk) of the 
system. The early identification of Near Misses can, then, be useful for online integrated risk 
monitoring, for rapidly detecting the incipient problems and setting up the recovery strategy of the 
occurred failures. The post-processing risk-significant features for the clustering are extracted from: 
i) the probability of a scenario to develop into an accidental scenario, ii) the severity of the 
consequences that the developing scenario would cause to the system, iii) the combination of i) and 
ii) into the overall risk of the developing scenario. The optimal selection of the extracted features is 
done by a wrapper approach, whereby a Modified Binary Differential Evolution (MBDE) embeds a 
K-means clustering algorithm. The characteristics of the Near Misses scenarios are identified solving 
a multi-objective optimization problem, using the Hamming distance as a measure of similarity. The 
feasibility of the analysis is shown with respect to fault scenarios in a dynamic Steam Generator (SG) 
of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). 
NOMENCLATURE 
Abbreviations 
CET   Continuous Event Tree 
CH    Calinski-Harabasz index 
DBA   Design Basis Accident 
DET   Dynamic Event Tree 
DSA    Deterministic Safety Analysis 
ET   Event Tree 
FT   Fault Tree 
IDPSA   Integrated Deterministic and Probabilistic Safety Analysis  
IE   Initiating Event 
MBDE   Modified Binary Differential Evolution  
MCS    Minimal Cuts Set 
MOP   Multi-Objective optimization Problem 
MVL   Multiple-Valued Logic 
NPP   Nuclear Power Plant  
PIs   Prime Implicants  
PSA   Probabilistic Safety Analysis  
SCP   Set Covering Problem 
SG    Steam Generator  
TH    Thermal-Hydraulics 
UTSG   U-Tube Steam Generator 
 
Symbols 
p    Probability that the developing scenario is an accidental scenario  
c    Consequence that the developing scenario can cause to the system 
r    Overall risk of the developing scenario 
𝑡   Time instant 
𝑝 (𝑡) Probability that at time 𝑡 the scenario can lead the system into an accidental 
scenario  
𝑐 (𝑡)   Consequence that at time 𝑡 the developing scenario is predicted to cause to the 
system 
𝑟 (𝑡)     Overall risk of the developing scenario at time 𝑡 
𝑄𝑒   Flow-rate of fresh feed-water entering the steam generator 
𝑃𝑜   Operating power  
𝑃𝑛   Nominal power  
𝑄𝑣   Flow-rate of dry steam exiting the steam generator. 
𝑁𝑟𝑙   Narrow Range steam generator water Level  
𝑊𝑟𝑙   Wide Range steam generator water Level 
𝑇𝑛   Time constant for the 𝑁𝑟𝑙 dynamics 
𝑄𝑒𝑓   Flow-rate of incoming water in steam generator tube bundle region. 
𝑇ℎ   Time constant for the water mass transportation dynamics 
𝜏   Time constant for the feed-water valve dynamics 
𝑄𝐺𝑉 Flow-rate of steam-water mixture exiting the steam generator tube bundle 
region 
𝑇𝑔   Time constant for the dynamics relating 𝑄𝑉 to 𝑄𝐺𝑉 
𝐹𝑔   Constant in the non-minimum phase term of the dynamics relating 𝑄𝑉 to 𝑄𝐺𝑉 
𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡   Time constant for the 𝑊𝑟𝑙 dynamics 
x   System state  
?̇?   Derivative of system state 
𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑓   Narrow Range steam generator water Level at a reference position  
𝑁ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ    Automatic reactor trip threshold 
𝑁𝑙𝑜𝑤   Turbine trip threshold 
𝑁ℎ𝑙   First pre-alarm automatic reactor trip threshold 
𝑁𝑙𝑙   First pre-alarm turbine trip threshold 
𝑁𝑣ℎ   Second pre-alarm automatic reactor trip threshold 
𝑁𝑣𝑙   First pre-alarm turbine trip threshold 
𝑄𝑝𝑖𝑑   Water flow rate provided by PID controller 
𝑄𝑠𝑓   Water flow rate removed by safety valve 
𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠   Mission time 
𝑡𝑚𝑣𝑙   Time steps in MVL discretization 
𝜑    Cumulative probability function of the Gaussian distribution  
µ    Mean value of the Gaussian distribution 
𝜎   Standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution 
A    Intensity coefficient 
𝐾   Number of clusters 
𝑛   Index of the profile of 𝑝, 𝑐 and 𝑟  
µ𝑛   Mean value of the 𝑛 − 𝑡ℎ profile 
max   Peak value of the 𝑛 − 𝑡ℎ profile 
σ𝑛   Standard deviation of the 𝑛 − 𝑡ℎ profile 
RMS   Root mean square of the 𝑛 − 𝑡ℎ profile 
𝑆𝐾   Skewness of the 𝑛 − 𝑡ℎ profile 
𝐾𝑈   Kurtosis of the 𝑛 − 𝑡ℎ profile 
N   Number of scenarios belogging to the training set 
F   Dimension of the set of features 
𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑡   Number of scenarios belogging to the test set  
𝑆𝑆𝑏    Overall between-cluster variance 
𝑆𝑆𝑤      Overall within-cluster variance 
𝑛𝑘    Number of scenarios assigned to the 𝑘-th cluster 
𝑥𝑐   Generic scenario 
𝑚𝑘   Centroid of the 𝑘-th cluster 
µ𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘   Mean risk of the clustered scenarios    
𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 Time elapsed from the instant at which 𝑟 starts to deviate from zero of the 
clustered scenarios 
𝑓    Fitness function of the MOP  
𝑓1    First objective function of the MOP 
𝑓2    Second objective function of the MOP 
?̅?   Sequence vector belonging to the Pareto set of the MOP 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Integrated Deterministic and Probabilistic Safety Analysis (IDPSA) attempts at overcoming some 
limitations of Deterministic Safety Analysis (DSA) and Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA). The 
former, is solidly founded on by the multi-barrier and defense-in-depth concepts, and aims at 
verifying the capability of a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) to withstand a set of postulated Design Basis 
Accidents (DBA) [Kang et al, 2013; Zio et al., 2012a]. To account for the uncertainties in the model 
representation of the actual plant behavior, conservatism is introduced in the calculations by Thermal-
Hydraulics (TH) codes under DBA conditions [Zio et al., 2010]. The latter aims at considering a 
wider set of possible accidental scenarios, and includes the quantification of accident probabilities 
[Aldemir, 2013; Keller et al., 2005].  
Both DSA and PSA are scenario-based analyses, where scenario selection and definition are done by 
expert judgment. State-of-the-art of DSA and PSA approaches can provide relevant and important 
insights on what is already known to be an “issue”, but they are not capable of revealing what, and to 
what extent, is not known (i.e., scenarios which are not expert-selected in the DSA and PSA input), 
with the risk of neglecting or underestimating potentially dangerous scenarios [Kudinov et al., 2011]. 
This is due to the difficulties of the static structure of the classic DSA and PSA approaches in treating 
dynamic variations that usually occur during the operational time of a process [Khakzad et al., 2012] 
due to (i) stochastic disturbances (e.g., equipment failures), (ii) deterministic plant responses (i.e., 
transients), (iii) controls and (iv) operator actions [Marseguerra et al., 1996; Kirschenbaum et al., 
2009; Kudinov et al., 2011]. Indeed, the order and timing of the events occurring along a scenario, 
and the values of the process variables at the time of event occurrence are critical in determining the 
evolution of the scenario itself [Aldemir et al., 2008]. 
The development and application of IDPSA in practice must meet the challenge of computational 
complexity, both in model construction and implementation, and in post-processing for the retrieval 
of the relevant information from the scenario outcomes. The number of dynamic scenario branches 
generated in IDPSA increases in power law with the number of occurring events and, thus, is much 
larger than in classical PSA based on Event Trees (ET) and Fault Trees (FT). The a posteriori 
information retrieval (post-processing), then, becomes quite burdensome and difficult [Labeau et al., 
2000; Zio, 2014]. Continuous Event Trees (CETs) [Devooght et al., 1992; Kopustinskas et al., 2005] 
and Dynamic Event Trees (DETs) [Hofer et al., 2004; Hakobyan et al., 2008] provide realistic 
frameworks for IDPSA. However, their application is limited by their computationally intensive 
nature, by the need of tailoring the algorithms to the system under consideration and by the need of 
processing a massive amount of data for any single initiating event considered [Di Maio et al., 2014a].  
Post-processing, in general, consists in classifying the generated dynamic scenarios into safe 
scenarios and Prime Implicants (PIs), i.e., sequences of events that represent minimal combinations 
of accident failures necessary for system failure and cannot be covered by more general implicants 
[Quine, 1952]. Among the safe scenarios, Near Misses are important scenarios to be identified, 
because they are those sequences of events that reach values of the safety parameters close to, but not 
exceeding, the corresponding acceptable thresholds [Zio et al., 2009]. They can, thus, be relevant 
contributors to the “hidden” risk of the system, and should not be neglected, as a small deviation may 
transform them into accidental scenarios. 
In literature, several authors introduce the concept of Near Misses as accident precursors [Bier et al., 
1995; Johnson et al., 1996]. We here consider Near Misses as sequences of events that incidentally 
keep the system in a safe state, but endangered and insecure. For the purpose of the analysis, they are 
here defined as sequences of events similar to those leading the system into fault conditions, except 
for one characteristic which is missing or is slightly different (e.g., sequence time lag, different failure 
magnitude, different involved component in an event) [Saleh et al., 2013].  
The post-processing analysis entails a ‘‘Forward” classification of the dynamic scenarios into classes, 
i.e., safe, PIs and Near Misses, and a ‘‘Backward” identification of the similarities of the features of 
the scenarios (i.e., stochastic event occurrence and deterministic process variables values), which 
characterize the groups of Near Misses among the whole set of safe scenarios. 
For the “Forward” classification of the Near Misses sequences, we look at two factors of risk: the 
probability of occurrence of an undesired event and the severity of the consequence caused by the 
event [Zadakbar et al., 2013]. Thus, we describe the sequences of events by: i) the probability (p) that 
the developing scenario is an accidental scenario, ii) the consequence (c) that the developing scenario 
can cause to the system, and iii) the overall risk (r) of the developing scenario, that we compute 
synthetically as r= p × c (expected consequence). 
The optimal features for discerning the Near Misses from the safe scenarios are extracted from the 
profiles of p, c, and r of the accidental scenarios and selected by a wrapper algorithm, which takes 
into account six statistical indicators of p, c, and r, and, through a Modified Binary Differential 
Evolution (MBDE) optimization algorithm, selects the best features, which are fed to a K-means 
clustering algorithm, which is a simple and well-known clustering algorithm (other classical 
clustering algorithms, such as mean-shift [Fukunaga et al., 1975; Mandelli et al., 2010] or fuzzy C-
means [Bezdek, 1981; Zio et al., 2009]). 
The outcomes of this “Forward” classification is, then, interpreted by a “Backward” identification of 
the similarities of the features of the Near Misses scenarios: the acquired knowledge can be exploited 
in an online integrated risk monitoring system that can rapidly detect the problem and set up a repair 
strategy of the occurred failures before that the system reaches a fault state. 
The proposed approach is illustrated with reference to scenarios occurring in the Steam Generator 
(SG) of a NPP [Aubry et al., 2012]. We use Multiple-Valued Logic (MVL) theory for modeling the 
behavior of the system, where timing and sequences of component failure events are determining the 
system behavior [Aldemir, 2013]. By using MVL, we increase the limited description capability of 
binary variables in modeling the different component operational states (for example, a valve that can 
be closed, partially closed or fully open, or can fail at different times) and, therefore, perform an 
IDPSA post-processing analysis on the whole set of simulated accidental scenarios [Di Maio et al., 
2014a]. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the SG model used to generate the scenarios for the 
reliability analysis is presented [Aubry et al., 2012], along with multistate representation of the system 
dynamics. In Section 3, the PIs are identified and the risk-based “Forward” and “Backward” Near 
Misses identification method is introduced with reference to the case study considered. In Section 4, 
conclusions and remarks are drawn. 
 
2. CASE STUDY  
2.1  The U-Tube Steam Generator (UTSG) model 
 
The U-Tube Steam Generator (UTSG) under consideration is sketched in Fig. 1. The improper control 
of the water level, whose difficulties arises from non-minimum phase plant characteristics, i.e., plant 
strong inverse response behavior, particularly at low operating power, due to the so-called “swell and 
shrink” effects [Kothare et al., 2000], is a major cause of NPP unavailability [Kothare et al., 2000; 
Habibiyan et al., 2004; Marseguerra et al., 2007].  
The reactor coolant enters the UTSG at the bottom, moves upward and then downward in the inverted 
U-tubes, transferring heat to the secondary fluid before exiting at the bottom. The secondary fluid, 
the feedwater (𝑄𝑒), enters the UTSG at the top of the downcomer, through the space between the tube 
bundle wrapper and the SG shell. The value of 𝑄𝑒 is regulated by a system of valves: a low flow rate 
valve, used when the operating power (𝑃𝑜) is smaller than 15% of nominal power (𝑃𝑛), and a high 
flow rate valve when 𝑃𝑜 > 0.15 𝑃𝑛 [Aubry et al., 2012]. In the secondary side of the tube bundle, water 
heats up, reaches saturation, starts boiling and turns into a two-phase mixture. The two-phase fluid 
moves up through the separator/riser section, where steam is separated from liquid water, and through 
the dryers, which ensure that the exiting steam (𝑄𝑣) is essentially dry. The separated water is 
recirculated back to the downcomer. The balance between the exiting 𝑄𝑣 and the incoming 𝑄𝑒 
governs the change in the water level in the SG. Because of the two-phase nature, two types of water 
level measurements are considered, as shown in Fig. 1, each reflecting a different level concept: the 
Narrow Range Level (𝑁𝑟𝑙) is calculated by pressure difference between two points close to the water 
level and indicates the mixture level, whereas, the Wide Range Level (𝑊𝑟𝑙) is calculated by pressure 
difference between the two extremities of the SG (steam dome and bottom of the downcomer) and 
indicates the collapsed liquid level that is related with the mass of water in the SG. 
 
       
Fig. 1. Schematic of the UTSG [IAEA-TECDOC-981, 1997] 
 
“Swell and shrink” phenomena are also modeled to reproduce the dynamic behavior of the SG: when 
𝑄𝑣 increases, the steam pressure in the steam dome decreases and the two-phase fluid in the tube 
bundle expands causing 𝑁𝑟𝑙 to initially swell (i.e., rise), instead of decreasing as would have been 
expected by the mass balance; contrarily, if 𝑄𝑣 decreases or 𝑄𝑒 increases, a shrink effect occurs. A 
similar model has been presented in [Aubry et al., 2012].  
The 𝑁𝑟𝑙 is governed by 𝑄𝑒 and 𝑄𝑣 across the tube bundle region of the SG as shown by the following 
transfer function: 
 
𝑁𝑟𝑙(s)=
1
𝑇𝑛 𝑠
(𝑄𝑒𝑓(𝑠) − 𝑄𝐺𝑉(𝑠))                                                                  
(1) 
 
where 𝑄𝑒𝑓 is the flow-rate of the incoming water in the tube bundle, (Eq. (2)), 𝑄𝐺𝑉 is the equivalent 
steam-water mixture flow-rate exiting the tube bundle region, (Eq. (3)), 𝑇𝑛  is a time constant that 
accounts for the 𝑁𝑟𝑙 dynamics. 
The incoming water flow-rate 𝑄𝑒𝑓 is proportional to 𝑄𝑒: 
 𝑄𝑒𝑓(s)=
1
(1+𝑇ℎ𝑠)(1+𝜏 𝑠)
 𝑄𝑒(𝑠)                                       (2) 
 
where the lag 1 (1 + 𝜏 𝑠)⁄  accounts for the feed-water valve dynamics and 1 (1 + 𝑇ℎ𝑠)⁄  accounts for 
the water mass transportation dynamics: their values are reported in Table 1.  
The exiting steam-water mass 𝑄𝐺𝑉 is proportional to 𝑄𝑣: 
  
𝑄𝐺𝑉(s)=
(1− 𝐹𝑔 𝑇𝑔 𝑠)
(1+𝑇𝑔 𝑠)
 𝑄𝑣(𝑠)                         
(3) 
 
where the first order lag 1 (1 + 𝑇𝑔 𝑠)⁄  accounts for the elapsed time from the turbine steam demand 
and the increase of 𝑄𝐺𝑉, and the non-minimum phase term (1 − 𝐹𝑔 𝑇𝑔 𝑠) accounts for the two-phase 
swell and shrink effects. 
Combining Eqs. (1), (2), and (3), 𝑁𝑟𝑙 is equal to: 
 
𝑁𝑟𝑙(s)=
1
𝑇𝑛 𝑠
(
𝑄𝑒(𝑠)
(1 + 𝑇ℎ𝑠)(1 + 𝜏 𝑠)
 −
(1 − 𝐹𝑔 𝑇𝑔 𝑠)
(1 + 𝑇𝑔 𝑠)
 𝑄𝑣(𝑠)) 
(4) 
 
and 𝑊𝑟𝑙, i.e., the overall water mass in the steam generator, is: 
 
𝑊𝑟𝑙(s)=
1
𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑠
(𝑄𝑒(𝑠) − 𝑄𝑣(𝑠))         (5) 
 
where 𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡  is a time constant that accounts for the 𝑊𝑟𝑙 dynamics. 
We assume 𝑦1 = 𝑁𝑟𝑙 and 𝑦2 = 𝑊𝑟𝑙, and 𝑢 = 𝑄𝑒 and 𝑑 = 𝑄𝑣; the state space representation of the SG 
model is, thus:   
 
?̇?(t) =
(
 
 
 
 
0 0 0
1
𝑇𝑛
0 −
1
𝑇ℎ
0 −
1
𝑇𝑛
0 0 −
1
𝑇𝑔
0
0 0 0 −
1
𝜏)
 
 
 
 
x(t) + 
(
 
0
0
0
1
𝜏)
  u(t) + 
(
 
 
−
1
𝑇𝑛
0
1+𝐹𝑔
𝑇𝑛
0 )
 
 
 d(t)                      
 
 
(6) 
 
 
𝑦(t) = (
1 1 1 0
𝑇𝑛
𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡
0 0
𝜏
𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡
)  x(t)                                                 
  (7) 
 
The values of the parameters 𝑇ℎ, 𝑇𝑛, 𝐹𝑔, 𝜏, 𝑇𝑔, 𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡 change depending on the power 𝑃𝑜, as shown in 
Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Parameters of the UTSG model at different power levels [Aubry et al., 2012] 
𝑃𝑜 0.03 × 𝑃𝑛 0.04 × 𝑃𝑛 0.09 × 𝑃𝑛 0.24 × 𝑃𝑛 0.30 × 𝑃𝑛 0.50 × 𝑃𝑛 𝑃𝑛 
𝑇𝑛 36 56 63 44 40 40 40 
𝐹𝑔 13 18 10 4 4 4 4 
𝑇ℎ 170 56 30 10 8 5 5 
𝜏 10 10 10 30 30 30 30 
𝑇𝑔 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
𝑇𝑖𝑛𝑡  140 140 140 140 140 140 140 
 
The goal of the system is to maintain the SG water level at a reference position (𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑓): the SG fails 
if the 𝑁𝑟𝑙 rises (falls) above (below) the threshold 𝑁ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ (𝑁𝑙𝑜𝑤), in which case automatic reactor or 
turbine trips are triggered. Indeed, if the 𝑁𝑟𝑙 exceeds 𝑁ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ, the steam separator and dryer lose their 
functionality and excessive moisture is carried in 𝑄𝑣, degrading the turbine blades profile and the 
turbine efficiency; if 𝑁𝑟𝑙 decreases below 𝑁𝑙𝑜𝑤, insufficient cooling capability of the primary fluid 
occurs. Similarly, the 𝑊𝑟𝑙, is relevant for the cooling capability of the primary circuit [Kothare et al., 
2000]. Pre-alarms are triggered when 𝑁𝑟𝑙 exceeds 𝑁ℎ𝑙 (𝑁𝑙𝑙) if a small deviation from 𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑓 occurs or 
when 𝑁𝑟𝑙 exceeds 𝑁𝑣ℎ (𝑁𝑣𝑙), when the deviation is large. Set points of 𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑓 and of 𝑁𝑟𝑙 depend on 𝑃𝑜, 
as shown in Fig. 2, and, thus, also the alarms thresholds depend on 𝑃𝑜. The 𝑁𝑟𝑙 set point is low at low 
𝑃𝑜, to partially account for the strong inverse response of 𝑁𝑟𝑙 [Kothare et al., 2000]; thus, the low 
level thresholds are more restrictive than the high level thresholds at low 𝑃𝑜. 
 
  
 
Fig. 2. Set point for 𝑁𝑟𝑙 at different power rate 𝑃𝑜 values.  
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 A dedicated model has been implemented in SIMULINK to simulate the dynamic response of the 
UTSG at different 𝑃𝑜 values. Both feedforward and feedback digital control schemes have been 
adopted. The feedback controller is a PID that provides a flow rate 𝑄𝑝𝑖𝑑 resulting from the residuals 
between 𝑁𝑟𝑙 and 𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑓, whereas the feedforward controller operates a safety relief valve that is opened 
if and only if 𝑁𝑟𝑙 exceeds the 𝑁ℎ𝑙, and removes a constant flow safety flow rate (𝑄𝑠𝑓). The block 
diagram representing the SIMULINK model of the SG is shown in Fig. 3: the controlled variable is 
𝑁𝑟𝑙, whereas the control variable is 𝑄𝑒. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Block diagram representing the SIMULINK model of the SG. 
 
2.2  The set of possible failures 
 
The set of multiple component failures that can occur during the system life are shown in Fig. 4: 
1. The outlet steam valve can fail stuck at a random time in [0, 4000] (s) in three different 
positions: i) closed; ii) stuck open at 50% of the nominal 𝑄𝑣 that should be provided at 𝑃𝑜; iii) 
stuck open at 150% of the nominal 𝑄𝑣 that should be provided at 𝑃𝑜. 
2. The safety relief valve can fail stuck at a random time in [0, 4000] (s), at a uniform random 
value 𝑄𝑠𝑓  in the range [0.5, 50.5] (kg/s). 
3. The communication between the sensor that monitors 𝑁𝑟𝑙 and the PID controller can fail at 
random times in [0, 4000] (s), in which case the PID is provided with the same input value of 
the previous time step. 
4. The PID controller can fail stuck at random times in [0, 4000] (s), providing a uniform random 
flow rate 𝑄𝑝𝑖𝑑 belonging to [-18, 18] % of the nominal 𝑄𝑒 that should be provided at 𝑃𝑜. 
It is worth noticing that in the UTSG there are two PID controllers and, thus, two communications 
between the sensors measuring 𝑁𝑟𝑙 and the PIDs (one for high power feedback control and the other 
for low power feedback control). The selective action of the PIDs depending on 𝑃𝑜 hides some of the 
failures. For example, if the power profile of the scenario under investigation is a ramp, both PIDs 
are called in operation: if anyone (or both) is (are) failed, their fault state is detectable. On the 
contrary, if we consider scenarios with constant power profile, e.g., low power rate (𝑃𝑜< 15% 𝑃𝑛), the 
occurrence of a high power feedback control failure cannot be detected, and, thus, the fault remains 
hidden. 
Choices and hypotheses for modeling the failures (i.e., the mission time, the number and type of 
faults, the distributions of failure times and magnitudes) have been arbitrarily made with the aim of 
generating multiple failures in the sequences and capturing the dynamic influence of their order, 
timing and magnitude. The choice of a mission time (𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠) equal to 4000 (s) has been made, because 
it is a long enough interval of time to allow the complete development also of slow dynamic accident 
scenarios. 
 
 Fig. 4. Sketch of the failures that can be injected into the system  
 
2.3  The Multistate representation of system dynamics 
 
For realistically treating the dynamic behavior of the UTSG when component failures occur, we go 
beyond the binary state representation and adopt a Multiple Value Logic (MVL) [Garibba et al., 1985; 
Di Maio et al., 2014a] for an approximated description of the continuous time of occurrence of 
component failures and their magnitude. The MVL allows describing that the components can fail at 
any (discrete) time (not only the initial time) along the scenario, with different (discrete) magnitudes 
(not only the most conservative). The discretization of the time and magnitudes values is as follows: 
 time discretization: we use the label 𝑡𝑚𝑣𝑙=1, 𝑡𝑚𝑣𝑙=2, 𝑡𝑚𝑣𝑙=3 and 𝑡𝑚𝑣𝑙=4, for failures 
occurring in the intervals [0, 1000] (s), [1001, 2000] (s), [2001, 3000] (s), [3001, 4000] (s), 
respectively; if the label 𝑡𝑚𝑣𝑙=0, the component does not fail within the time of the whole 
scenario, 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠.  
 Magnitude discretization: 
 the steam valve magnitude is indicated as 1, 2 or 3 for failure states corresponding to 
stuck at 0%, stuck at 50% and stuck at 150% of the 𝑄𝑒 value that should be provided 
at 𝑃𝑜, respectively; if the steam valve magnitude is indicated as 0, the component does 
not fail in 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠;  
 the safety relief valve fails with magnitude indicated as 1, 2, 3 and 4, if it is stuck 
between [0.5, 12.6] (kg/s), (12.6, 25.27] (kg/s), (25.27, 37.91] (kg/s) and (37.91, 50.5] 
(kg/s), respectively; if the safety relief valve magnitude is indicated as 0, the 
component does not fail in 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠;   
 the communication between the sensor measuring 𝑁𝑟𝑙 and the PID controller is 
labelled 0 if the communication works, 1 otherwise; 
 the PID controller failure magnitude range is discretized into 8 equally spaced 
magnitude intervals, labelled from 1 to 8, representative of failure states 
corresponding to discrete intervals of output value belonging to [-18,18]% of the 𝑄𝑒 
value that should be provided at 𝑃𝑜; if the PID controller magnitude is labelled as 0, 
the component does not fail in 𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠. 
The values of time, magnitude and order of failure occurrence for each component are included into 
a sequence vector that represents a scenario. As an example, the sequence vector of  Fig. 5 represents 
a scenario where: the steam valve fails stuck at its maximum allowable value at a time in [3001, 4000] 
(s) and it is the third event occurring along the sequence; the safety relief valve fails first in [0, 1000] 
(s), with a magnitude belonging to [0.5, 12.6] (kg/s); the communication between the sensor 
measuring 𝑁𝑟𝑙 and the PID controller is the second failure event in the sequence and occurs in [2001, 
3000] (s); finally, the PID controller fails stuck in [3001, 4000] (s), with a magnitude belonging to 
[6, 10] % of the 𝑄𝑒 value that should be provided at 𝑃𝑜. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Sequence vector representing a scenario.  
 
The number of possible sequence vectors that arise from the MVL discretization are 100509, each 
one evolving towards either safe or faulty conditions. To investigate this, a Monte Carlo-driven fault 
injection engine is used to sample combinations of discrete times and discrete magnitudes of 
components failures. 
The (dynamic) analysis has been performed with respect to the two constant power scenarios, 5% 𝑃𝑛 
(low power level) and 80% 𝑃𝑛 (high power level). The system configurations considered are listed in 
Table 2. 
  
Table 2.  System configurations  
System 
configurations 
Failure of the 
Outlet Steam 
Valve 
Failure of the 
Safety Relief 
Valve 
Level sensor- 
PID controller 
communication 
interruption  
Failure of 
the PID 
controller 
1 - - - - 
2 X - - - 
3 - X - - 
4 - - X - 
5 - - - X 
6 X X - - 
7 X - X - 
8 X - - X 
9 - X X - 
10 - X - X 
11 - - X X 
12 X X X - 
13 X X - X 
14 X - X X 
15 - X X X 
16 X X X X 
 
The dynamic analysis shows that the same combination of components failures does not 
unequivocally lead to only one system end state but, rather, it depends on when the failures occur and 
with what magnitude. This is shown in Fig. 6, where the frequencies of occurrence of the three system 
end states (“High”, “Safe” and “Low”) are plotted for the 16 dynamic system configurations of Table 
2. 
 
 Fig. 6. Histograms for high power level (a) and low power level (b) of the frequencies of 
occurrence of the end states for each of the 16 system configurations of Table 2, simulated by 
sampling discrete failure times and magnitudes of components failures. 
 
Fig. 7 shows that, at high power operation, the timing of the events is quite important, because with 
the same system configuration but different times of failure occurrences, the system end state 
changes. Specifically, in Fig. 7 (a), the safety valve fails stuck at 100% of 𝑄𝑠𝑓 after 1020 seconds and 
the communication between the sensor measuring 𝑁𝑟𝑙 and the PID controller fails at: 
- 1052 seconds (solid line). 
- 1063 seconds (dashed-dotted line). 
The two scenarios lead to low and high failure modes, respectively, whereas they would be considered 
as Minimal Cuts Sets (MCS) in a static reliability analysis presented in Appendix 1.  
Fig. 7 (b) shows the effects of different failures magnitudes on the system end state: the safety relief 
valve fails stuck in its maximum position at 2000 seconds, the communication fails at 2010 seconds 
and the PID controller fails at 2020 seconds with two different magnitudes: 
- Magnitude equal to 13% of the nominal 𝑄𝑒 value that should be provided at 80 % 𝑃𝑛 (dashed-
dotted line). 
- Magnitude equals to 12% of the nominal 𝑄𝑒 value that should be provided at 80 % 𝑃𝑛 (solid 
line). 
 
 (a)                                                                            (b) 
Fig. 7. Example of dynamic system behavior at 80% 𝑃𝑛. 
 
The low power scenarios also present dynamic effects, as shown in Fig. 8. In particular, Fig. 8 (a) 
shows the effects of the timing on the system end state: the safety relief valve fails stuck at 𝑄𝑠𝑓 = 50.5 
(kg/s) at 1005 (s) and the steam output valve fails stuck at 150 % of the nominal 𝑄𝑣 value that should 
be provided at 5 % 𝑃𝑛 at: 
- 1046 seconds (dashed-dotted line).   
- 1047 seconds (solid line). 
Fig. 8 (b) shows the effects of the order of components failure occurrence on the system end state: 
the safety relief valve fails stuck at 𝑄𝑠𝑓 = 50.5 (kg/s) and the PID controller fails stuck at its minimum 
allowable value: 
- The PID controller failure is the first failure event along the sequence of events (dashed-dotted 
line).   
- The safety relief valve failure is the first failure event along the sequence of events (solid line). 
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 (a)                                                                            (b) 
Fig. 8. Example of dynamic system behavior at 5% 𝑃𝑛.  
 
Hereafter, without loss of generality, among the system configurations of Table 2, we focus only on 
the classification of the PIs and Near Misses of the high level failure mode at high power level (𝑃𝑜 = 
80% 𝑃𝑛).  
 
3. Near Misses identification 
 
The Near Misses identification is here treated as a classification problem, in which Near Misses are 
sorted out from the safe scenarios, among the whole set of accidental transients simulated. In practice, 
the PIs are first identified among the whole set of 100509 possible scenarios and, then, the Near 
Misses are separated out among the remaining safe scenarios. 
 
 
3.1  Prime Implicants identification 
 
A PI is a set of variables that represents a minimal combination of accident component failures 
necessary for system failure and cannot be covered by a more reduced implicant [Quine, 1952; Di 
Maio et al., 2014a]. Note that in our case the “PIs” identification task may consider non-coherent 
structure functions, for which both failed and working states of the same components can lead the 
system to failure. In such circumstances, traditional methods, e.g. based on minimal cut sets analysis, 
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cannot be applied, whereas dynamic reliability methods need to be applied for the identification of 
the PIs [Di Maio et al., 2013; Di Maio et al., 2014b]. 
The PIs identification among the whole set of 100509 possible scenarios is performed by means of 
the visual interactive method presented in [Di Maio et al., 2014b]. The basic idea it relies on is that 
PIs are those scenarios with as few as possible events that are capable of leading the system into a 
failure state [Rocco et al., 2004]; then, we first select as most important feature for the PIs 
identification the literal cost of the sequence vector (i.e., the number of components whose behavior 
is specified in the accident sequence) and then, the accident sequences associated with the lowest 
literal cost are selected and stored as PIs. In fact, these are the most reduced sequences (i.e., with least 
number of events) that cannot be covered by any other implicant, and, thus, these are PIs by definition. 
The selected PIs, and the implicants covered by them, are deleted from the set of implicants and, the 
procedure is repeated for the remaining implicants until all are covered. By so doing, 1255 PIs are 
identified for the high level failure mode, covering 36128 minterms. The total computational time 
approximately required for the identification of the PIs is 780 (s) on an Intel® Core™ 2 Duo T9300 
CPU @2.50 GHz. 
 
3.2 The “forward” classification 
 
Once the (1255) PIs for the SG high level failure mode have been identified, they are removed from 
the set of all possible scenarios, which is left with 64381 safe scenarios. For the identification of Near 
Misses among these, we resort to their definition as sequences of failure events that indeed keep the 
system in a safe condition, but endangered (i.e., a quasi-fault system state). To this aim, we introduce 
a risk-based characterization of these remaining scenarios, calculating their associated risk, at each 
time instant 𝑡, as [Zadakbar et al., 2013]: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 (𝑡) = 𝑝 (𝑡)  ×  𝑐(𝑡)   (8) 
 
where 𝑝(𝑡) is the probability that at time 𝑡 the scenario can lead the system into an accidental scenario 
and 𝑐(𝑡) is the consequence that the developing scenario is predicted to cause to the system.  
In this view, we build a functional relationship such that 𝑝 increases as 𝑁𝑟𝑙 moves further away from 
the reference level 𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑓, in a way that 𝑝 = 0 if 𝑁𝑟𝑙 is equal to 𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑓 and 𝑝 = 1 if 𝑁𝑟𝑙 reaches 𝑁ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ. 
Such relationship is given in Eq. (9) below, assuming that scenarios whose 𝑁𝑟𝑙(𝑡) approaches 𝑁ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 
are more prone to failure than those with 𝑁𝑟𝑙(𝑡) close to 𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑓, i.e., Eq. (9) “filters-out” (i.e., neglects) 
scenarios whose 𝑁𝑟𝑙(𝑡) is close to 𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑓 and “mines” (i.e., weighs more) scenarios whose 𝑁𝑟𝑙(𝑡) is 
close to 𝑁ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ:  
 
 𝑝 (𝑡) = 𝜑 (
𝑁𝑟𝑙 (𝑡) − (µ + 5 𝜎)
𝜎
) =  ∫
1
√2𝜋  𝜎
𝑒
(𝑁𝑟𝑙(𝑡)−(µ+5𝜎))
2
2 𝜎2  𝑑𝑁𝑟𝑙
𝑁𝑟𝑙 (𝑡)
𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑓
                                                (9) 
 
where 𝜑 is the cumulative probability function of the Gaussian distribution with mean µ = 𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑓, and 
standard deviation 𝜎 =  
𝑁ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ− 𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑓
5
 . Fig. 9 shows the trend of 𝑝(𝑡).  
 
 
Fig. 9. Probability function 𝑝(𝑡) for the definition of risk. 
 
The consequence 𝑐(𝑡) of a scenario increases as 𝑁𝑟𝑙 approaches the failure threshold 𝑁ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ, 𝑐(𝑡) can 
be calculated at time 𝑡 as [Zadakbar et al., 2013]:  
 
𝑐 (𝑡) = 𝐴
𝑁𝑅𝐿(𝑡) − (µ + 3𝜎)
𝑁𝑅𝐿(𝑡)− µ  
  (10) 
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 where A is the intensity coefficient that accounts for the closeness of 𝑁𝑟𝑙 to the thresholds 𝑁ℎ𝑙, 𝑁𝑣ℎ 
and 𝑁ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ, and for the exceedance time between the first event of the failure sequence (hereafter 
called Initiating Event (IE)) and the time of exceeding the threshold: the shorter this time, the more 
critical the scenario. Thus, A is larger the faster and closer 𝑁𝑟𝑙 approaches a threshold; we assume: 
A=100 (No consequences) if no threshold is exceeded; A=200 (Low consequences) if 𝑁𝑟𝑙 exceeds 
𝑁ℎ𝑙 after at least 2001 (s) from IE or if 𝑁𝑟𝑙 exceeds 𝑁𝑣ℎ after at least 3001 (s) from IE; A=300 
(Medium consequences) if 𝑁𝑟𝑙 exceeds 𝑁ℎ𝑙 within 2000 (s) from IE, if 𝑁𝑟𝑙 exceeds 𝑁𝑣ℎ and the 
elapsed time is in [1001, 3000] (s), and if 𝑁𝑟𝑙 exceeds 𝑁ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ after at least 2001(s) from IE; A=400 
(Catastrophic consequences) if 𝑁𝑟𝑙 exceeds 𝑁𝑣ℎ within 1000 (s) from IE or if 𝑁𝑟𝑙 exceeds 𝑁ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ and 
the elapsed time from IE is in [1, 2000] (s). A matrix representation of the intensity coefficient is 
shown in Fig. 10.  
 
Fig. 10. Matrix representation of the intensity coefficient A. 
 
By so doing, the available 64381 remaining safe scenarios are fully described at each time instant 𝑡 
=1,2…..4000 [s] by their values of probability 𝑝(𝑡), consequence 𝑐(𝑡) and overall risk 𝑟(𝑡). An 
example of the 𝑝(𝑡), 𝑐(𝑡), 𝑟(𝑡) evolutions for two generic trends of 𝑁𝑟𝑙(𝑡) is shown in Fig. 11. More 
specifically, the 𝑁𝑟𝑙(𝑡) behaviors represented in Fig. 11 (first row) are due to: 
 solid line: the PID controller fails at 100 (s) with magnitude 4 and the safety relief valve fails 
at 190 (s) with magnitude 2; 
 dashed-dotted line: the safety relief valve fails at 100 (s) with magnitude 1, the 
communication between the sensor measuring 𝑁𝑟𝑙 and the PID controller is interrupted at 
136 (s) and the PID controller fails at 3917 (s) with magnitude 5; 
A=400 
A=200 
A=300 
A=100 
It is worth analysing the behavior of 𝑝(𝑡), 𝑐(𝑡), and, thus, 𝑟(𝑡) considered (Fig. 11, second, third and 
fourth row, respectively): all three abovementioned functions increase as 𝑁𝑟𝑙(𝑡) moves further away 
from 𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑓 and decrease as 𝑁𝑟𝑙(𝑡) approach 𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑓. The steps shown in the consequences and risk plots 
(around 800 [s] for the solid line scenario and around 3500[s] for the dashed-dotted line scenario) are 
due to the change of the discrete consequence intensity coefficient A along the scenarios. The solid 
line scenario is faster than the dashed-dotted line scenario (upper plot) and, thus, the value of the 
parameters A for the former scenario is 400 (Catastrophic consequences, see Fig. 10), due to the fact 
that 𝑁𝑟𝑙(𝑡) exceeds 𝑁𝑣ℎ within 1000 (s), whereas, A=300 (Medium consequences, see Fig. 10) for the 
dashed-dotted scenarios, because 𝑁𝑟𝑙(𝑡) exceeds 𝑁𝑣ℎ within [1001, 3000] (s). Thus, the solid line 
scenario is more abrupt in its development towards failure and expected to have more catastrophic 
consequences, and, thus, more overall risk, than the dashed-dotted scenario, because the time between 
IE and the exceedance of 𝑁𝑣ℎ is shorter (i.e, less grace time). 
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Fig. 11. Probability 𝑝(𝑡), consequences 𝑐(𝑡) and risk 𝑟(𝑡) for two sequences of events. 
 
3.2.1 Features selection 
 
The identification of the Near Misses is treated as an unsupervised classification problem and 
addressed by clustering, where i) the number of clusters is unknown and ii) the features that enable 
the best clustering according to the risk-based characteristic profiles of 𝑝(𝑡), 𝑐(𝑡) and 𝑟(𝑡) of the 
accidental scenarios are unknown. Unsupervised clustering, thus, entails identifying the number 𝐾 of 
clusters in which similar scenarios can be grouped according to similar values of some scenario 
features. To do this, from the profiles 𝑝(𝑡), 𝑐(𝑡) and 𝑟(𝑡), we extract some statistical indicators as 
features [Zio et al., 2012b]: 
 
1. Mean value  µ𝑛 = 
1
𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠
 ∑ 𝑛(𝑡)𝑁𝑡=1       
2. Peak value  max =  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑡=1,2….𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑛(𝑡) 
3. Standard deviation σ𝑛 = √
1
𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠−1
∑ (𝑛(𝑡) − µ)2
𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠
𝑡=1   
4. Root mean square  RMS =  √
1
𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠
∑ (𝑛(𝑡))2
𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠
𝑡=1  
5. Skewness   𝑆𝐾 = 
∑ (𝑛(𝑡)− µ)3
𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠
𝑡=1
𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠−1
  
6. Kurtosis  𝐾𝑈 =  
∑ (𝑛(𝑡)− µ)4
𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠
𝑡=1
𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠−1
  
 
where 𝑛(𝑡) is alternatively equal to 𝑝(𝑡), 𝑐(𝑡) and 𝑟(𝑡) and, thus, the total number of features is equal 
to 6×3=18. Among these 18 available features, we search for those that are optimal for clustering the 
64381 scenarios in Near Misses and safe scenarios. 
We resort to a wrapper framework [Kohavi et al., 1997; Baraldi et al., 2014], whereby a Modified 
Binary Differential Evolution (MBDE) search engine [Wang et al., 2010; Di Maio et al., 2013] 
searches candidate groups of features sets that are fed to a K-means clustering algorithm [MacQueen, 
1967]; eventually, the wrapper evolves so that among these candidate groups, the group retained is 
that which makes the K-means clustering algorithm perform best (most compact and separate 
clusters). The idea behind the wrapper approach is shown in Fig. 12. During the features search by 
MBDE, the K-means clustering is run on the N = 0.80 × 64381 = 51505 (training) safe scenarios with 
sets of features (F) that are randomly selected by the MBDE algorithm. The optimal number (𝐾) of 
clusters is also unknown and it is determined by looking at the clustering performance obtained by 
the K-means with reference to the Calinski-Harabasz (CH) index [Calinski et al., 1974], which 
accounts for the ratio of the overall between-cluster variance (separation) and the overall within-
cluster variance (compactness). The search proceeds iteratively until the CH index is maximised and 
the number of clusters 𝐾 is fixed. Then, the results of the wrapper algorithm are evaluated on an 
independent test set (𝑇𝑠𝑒𝑡), i.e., the 0.2 × 643281= 12876 safe scenarios that have been left out during 
the training phase. 
 
 
Fig. 12. Wrapper approach for optimal feature subset selection based on a MBDE optimization 
algorithm and a K-means classifier. 
 
The CH index for a number 𝐾 of clusters, 𝑘 = 1, 2, …, 𝐾 is equal to [Calinski et al., 1974]: 
 
𝐶𝐻 =  
𝑆𝑆𝑏
𝑆𝑆𝑤
 ×  
(𝑁 × 𝐹) − 𝐾
𝐾 − 1
 (11) 
 
where 𝑆𝑆𝑏 is the overall between-cluster variance, 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑏 = ∑𝑛𝑘 ‖𝑚𝑘 −𝑚‖
2
𝐾
𝑘=1
 (12) 
 
 and 𝑆𝑆𝑤 is the overall within-cluster variance, 
 
𝑆𝑆𝑤 = ∑∑‖𝑥𝑐 −𝑚𝑘‖
2
𝑥∈𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
 (13) 
 
where, 𝑛𝑘 is the number of scenarios 𝑥𝑐 assigned to the 𝑘-th cluster, 𝑚𝑘 is the centroid of the 𝑘-th 
cluster, i.e., the mean of the selected features belonging to the 𝑘-th cluster, 𝑚 is the mean of the 
selected features, and ‖𝑚𝑘 −𝑚‖
2 and ‖𝑥𝑐 −𝑚𝑘‖
2 are the L2 norms, i.e. Euclidean distances, 
between the two vectors. 
The optimal features selection provides as best features: the standard deviation of 𝑐(𝑡), the standard 
deviation of 𝑟(𝑡) and the root mean square of 𝑟(𝑡); the best performance is obtained with 
CH=9.35e+04 and 𝐾= 5. 
 
3.2.2 The clustering results 
 
The 𝐾= 5 obtained clusters of the safe scenarios are shown in Fig. 13 with reference to the features 
of mean risk (µ𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘) and time elapsed from the instant 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 at which 𝑟(𝑡) starts to deviate from zero, 
i.e., the time interval during which the system is exposed to risk. The rationale behind this choice is 
that the larger µ𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 and the longer 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘, the more dangerous the scenarios. In Fig. 13, clusters 3, 4, 5 
(triangles, crosses and squares, respectively) are well separated, i.e., the low level risk scenarios 
clusters are widened by the adoption of Eq. (9) for the quantification of the risk profile 𝑟(𝑡). It is 
possible to distinguish the scenarios having the lowest risk level from the scenarios having low risk 
level, and, thus, the highest risk scenarios are well separated from the lower risk scenarios. The good 
performance obtained when Eq. (9) is adopted instead of other 𝑝(𝑡) profiles, e.g., linear probability 
function (𝑝 (𝑡) 𝛼 𝑁𝑟𝑙 (𝑡)) that would give the same importance to any level 𝑁𝑟𝑙, for the quantification 
of the risk profile 𝑟(𝑡) is due to the fact that Eq. (9) “filters-out” (i.e., neglects) scenarios whose 𝑁𝑟𝑙(𝑡) 
is close to 𝑁𝑟𝑒𝑓 and “mines” (i.e., weighs more) scenarios whose 𝑁𝑟𝑙(𝑡) is close to 𝑁ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ: the 332 
circles in Fig. 13 (listed in Appendix 2) can, thus, be considered the Near Misses scenarios, i.e., 
scenarios that incidentally keep the system into safe state, although in endangered and insecure, 
operational conditions. 
 
 
Fig. 13. Clustering results. 
 
3.3 The “backward” approach 
 
Once the Near Misses for the SG high level failure mode have been identified by clustering, we can 
search for similarities among them in terms of their Multiple Value sequences, i.e., order and timing 
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of event occurrences and deterministic process variables values. This “backward” approach can lead 
us to finding the minimum conditions, i.e., minimum µ𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 and minimum 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘, that lead the system 
into a quasi-fault state. The problem can be framed as a Multi-Objective optimization Problem (MOP) 
[Deb et al., 2002] that looks for the set of scenarios ?̅? that to dominate any other scenarios with respect 
to the fitness function 𝑓: 
 
𝑓 (𝑥) = [𝑓1(µ𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘), 𝑓2(𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)]            (14) 
 
where 𝑓1 and 𝑓2 are the objectives functions of the defined MOP, i.e., minimum µ𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 and 𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘, 
respectively. The solution of the MOP of Eq. (14) is the Pareto set shown in Fig. 14, where 12 
solutions are plotted (squares lined by continuous line) and listed in Table 3. These scenarios ?̅? of 
minimum 𝑓(𝑥) are expected to cover all failure of Near Misses scenarios cluster.  
 
Fig. 14. Pareto front for the cluster of Near Misses 
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Table 3. List of the Pareto-optimal ?̅? sequence vectors. 
?̅?  
Steam 
valve 
failure 
time 
Steam 
valve 
failure 
magnitude 
Steam 
valve 
failure 
order 
Safety 
valve 
failure 
time 
Safety 
valve 
failure 
magnitude 
Safety 
valve 
failure 
order 
Sensor- 
PID 
failure 
time 
Sensor- 
PID 
failure 
magnitude 
Sensor-
PID 
failure 
order 
PID 
failure 
time 
PID 
failure 
magnitude 
PID 
failure 
order 
1. 0 0 0 2 3 1 4 1 2 4 3 3 
2. 3 1 4 1 2 3 1 1 2 1 4 1 
3. 3 1 4 2 2 3 2 1 1 2 4 2 
4. 3 1 3 2 2 2 4 1 4 1 4 1 
5. 3 1 4 3 3 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 
6. 3 2 4 1 2 2 1 1 3 1 4 1 
7. 3 2 4 2 3 1 2 1 2 3 3 3 
8. 4 1 3 3 2 2 4 1 4 2 4 1 
9. 4 2 3 1 3 2 0 0 0 1 3 1 
10. 4 2 4 2 1 3 2 1 1 2 4 2 
11. 4 2 3 4 2 2 0 0 0 4 4 1 
12. 4 2 4 4 2 3 2 1 1 4 4 2 
 
The coverage can be verified by, first, identifying the most similar characteristics of the sequence 
vectors belonging to the Near Misses cluster with the Pareto set scenarios ?̅?, and, then, by solving a 
Set Covering Problem (SCP) [Beasley et al., 1996; Di Maio et al., 2014c]. 
The most similar characteristics can be computed by Coverage vectors (one for each scenario 
belonging to ?̅?): this  entails calculating the Hamming distance [Hamming, 1950] between each 
 sequence vectors in ?̅? and each one of the other sequence vectors in the Near Misses cluster [Popa et 
al., 2010]. The entries of the coverage vector (in our case twelve entries, one for time, magnitude and 
order of occurrence of each component failure, see Fig. 5) are increased if the Hamming distance 
between one same entry of the considered scenario belonging to ?̅? and of the Near Misses vectors is 
equal to zero, as shown, without loss of generality, in Fig. 15 for 1 sequence vector of ?̅? and only 2 
Near Misses vectors. 
 
 Fig. 15. Coverage vector computation by Hamming distance. 
 
Table 4 lists the 12 coverage vectors, where each entry is the percentage of Near Misses vectors 
having the same stochastic behavior of the optimal set ?̅? shown in Table 3. It can be seen that, for 
each scenario belonging to ?̅?, columns 8, 11, 12 (e.g., Sensor-PID communication failure magnitude, 
PID failure magnitude and PID order of failure, respectively) have the largest values of the coverage 
vectors: this means that the majority of the sequence vectors of the Near Misses clusters can be well 
represented by (only) these failures. Furthermore, the analysis of the MVL values of the scenarios 
belonging to ?̅? (Table 3) where the largest coverage values of these colums are registered (i.e, 87%, 
98.5% and 85.2% for columns 8, 11 and 12, respectively) highlights that these failures are 
characterized by the same MVL values, that can be summarized as: 
 the failure of the communication between the sensor monitoring the 𝑁𝑟𝑙 and the PID 
controller; 
 the failure of the PID controller with magnitude belonging to [-5, -1] % of the 𝑄𝑒 value that 
should be provided at 𝑃𝑜, i.e., magnitude equal to 4 in MVL framework, and it is the first 
accident occurring along the sequence of events in over 85% of the Near Misses scenarios. 
Table 4. List of coverage vectors for each scenario belonging to the Pareto set ?̅?. 
?̅?  
Steam 
valve 
failure 
time 
Steam 
valve 
failure 
magnitude 
Steam 
valve 
failure 
order 
Safety 
valve 
failure 
time 
Safety 
valve 
failure 
magnitude 
Safety 
valve 
failure 
order 
Sensor- 
PID 
failure 
time 
Sensor- 
PID 
failure 
magnitude 
Sensor-
PID 
failure 
order 
PID 
failure 
time 
PID 
failure 
magnitude 
PID 
failure 
order 
1. 11.4 11.4 11.4 8.1 30.4 0.6 25.3 87 46.4 1.2 1.5 0.6 
2. 30.1 44.3 27.1 1.2 19.9 38 19.6 87 46.4 68.1 98.5 85.2 
3. 30.1 44.3 27.1 8.1 19.9 38 22.3 87 14.2 27.4 98.5 14.2 
4. 30.1 44.3 42.2 8.1 19.9 19.9 25.3 87 12.7 68.1 98.5 85.2 
5. 30.1 44.3 27.1 28 30.4 38 22.3 87 46.4 68.1 98.5 85.2 
6. 30.1 36.1 27.1 1.2 19.9 19.9 19.6 87 13.9 68.1 98.5 85.2 
7. 30.1 36.1 27.1 8.1 30.4 0.6 22.3 87 46.4 3.3 1.5 0.60 
8. 52.4 44.3 42.2 28 19.9 19.9 25.3 87 12.7 27.4 98.5 85.2 
9. 52.4 36.1 42.2 1.2 30.4 19.9 13 13 13 68.1 1.5 85.2 
10. 52.4 36.1 27.1 8.1 9.04 38 22.3 87 14.2 27.4 98.5 14.2 
11. 52.4 36.1 42.2 51.2 19.9 19.9 13 13 13 1.2 98.5 85.2 
12. 52.4 36.1 27.1 51.2 19.9 38 22.3 87 14.2 1.2 98.5 14.2 
 
A SCP can, thus, be solved for verifying that these latest characteristics are the minimum set of 
stochastic event occurrences and deterministic process variables values of ?̅? that exhaustively 
describe the scenarios belonging to the Near Misses cluster: if a Near Miss sequence vector is 
characterized by (at least) one of the common characteristics, this is covered by the optimal set ?̅?. In 
the present application we have verified that all the scenarios belonging to the identified Near Misses 
cluster are covered by the minimal conditions that lead the system into a quasi-fault state, i.e., the 
optimal set ?̅?. In conclusion, it is sufficient the occurrence of one of the common characteristics listed 
above to lead the system in endangered and insecure operational conditions. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, a risk-based clustering approach for Near Misses identification has been proposed. The 
approach includes a risk-based feature selection task, where by each safe scenario is described in 
terms of probability, consequence and overall risk. The optimal features set is identified by a wrapper 
approach based on the combination of a MBDE algorithm with K-means clustering. The 
characteristics of the Near Misses scenarios are, then, identified solving a multi-objective 
optimization problem and Hamming distance as a measure of similarity. 
The application of the approach to a case study of IDPSA of a UTSG has shown the possibility of 
retrieving relevant information for risk monitoring.  
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APPENDIX 1 
 
For a static reliability analysis of the UTSG, we conservatively assume that component failures occur 
at the beginning of the scenario, with magnitudes equal to their extreme (either maximum or 
minimum) plausible values [Zio et al., 2009]. We analyze the dynamic response of the system at 
constant 𝑃𝑜 values (𝑃𝑜 = 5% 𝑃𝑛 and 𝑃𝑜 = 80% 𝑃𝑛) and identify the Minimal Cuts Sets (MCS) with 
respect to the low and high level failure modes. Considering the binary, safe or faulty, states of the 6 
components, (component state is 0 if it works and 1 if it is failed), the number of possible system 
configurations is equal to 26. However, many configurations are not detectable in constant power 
scenarios, e.g., simultaneous occurrence of low and high power communication failures, whereas 
some others are not important when event occurrence timing is not considered, e.g., PID and 
communication failures occur simultaneously, because, in this case, the feedback control output 
would always be the same as a stand-alone PID failure. Thus, the possible system configurations to 
be considered in a static analysis with constant power is equal to 12 for each power level (Table A.1).  
 
Table A.1. Possible system configurations to be considered in the static reliability analysis 
with constant power profile 
System 
configurations 
Failure of the 
Outlet Steam 
Valve 
Failure of the 
Safety Relief 
Valve 
Level sensor- 
PID controller 
communication 
interruption  
Failure of 
the PID 
controller 
1 - - - - 
2 X - - - 
3 - X - - 
4 - - X - 
5 - - - X 
6 X X - - 
7 X - X - 
8 X - - X 
9 - X X - 
10 - X - X 
11 X X X - 
12 X X - X 
 
To identify the system MCS, the different system configurations of Table A.1 have been simulated 
by the SIMULINK model, at low and at high (constant) power levels. It turns out that the MCSs for 
the high level failure mode are the same at both power levels (Fig. A.1): the failure of the PID 
controller at its minimum values (i.e., -18% of the nominal 𝑄𝑒 that should be provided at 𝑃𝑜) and of 
the steam valve at its maximum value (i.e., 150% of the nominal 𝑄𝑣 value that should be provided at 
𝑃𝑜) are two first order MCS. The 𝑁𝑟𝑙 evolutions when these MCSs occur are shown in Figs. A.2 and 
A.3.  
 
 Fig. A.1. Fault Tree for the high level failure mode 
 
 
(a)                                                                     (b) 
Fig. A.2. 𝑁𝑟𝑙 evolution when the PID controller output is stuck at time t=0 at the minimum 
allowable value of -18% of nominal 𝑄𝑒 that should be provided at 5% 𝑃𝑛 (a) and at 80% 𝑃𝑛 (b).  
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Fig. A.3. 𝑁𝑟𝑙 evolution when the steam valve fails stuck at time t=0 at the maximum allowable 
value of 150% of nominal 𝑄𝑣 that should be provided at 5% 𝑃𝑛 (a) and at 80% 𝑃𝑛 (b). 
 
The analysis of the low level failure mode provides different MCSs at different 𝑃𝑜. At 5% 𝑃𝑛, there 
are three first order MCSs represented by: i) Safety valve fails stuck at the maximum allowable value, 
i.e., 𝑄𝑠𝑓 = 50.5 (kg/s); ii) Steam valve fails stuck closed; iii) PID controller fails stuck at its maximum 
values, (i.e., 18% of the nominal 𝑄𝑒 value that should be provided at 5% 𝑃𝑛). The 𝑁𝑟𝑙 evolution when 
these MCSs occur and the relative FT are shown in Fig. A.4 and Fig. A.5, respectively.  
 
 
(a)                                                           (b)                                                   (c) 
Fig. A.4. (a) 𝑁𝑟𝑙 evolution when the safety relief valve fails stuck with 𝑄𝑠𝑓 = 50.5 (kg/s); (b) the 
steam valve fails stuck closed; (c) the PID controller fails stuck at 18% of nominal 𝑄𝑒 that should 
be provided at 5% 𝑃𝑛. 
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Fig. A.5. Fault Tree for the low level failure mode at low power. 
 
At 80% 𝑃𝑛, three MCSs are found: i) a second-order MCS that combines the failure of the safety relief 
valve at its maximum allowable value, i.e., 𝑄𝑠𝑓 = 50.5 (kg/s), and the failure of the communication, 
ii) the steam valve failure in a closed position and iii) the PID controller fails at its maximum value 
(i.e., 18% of the nominal 𝑄𝑒 value that should be provided at 80% 𝑃𝑛). The 𝑁𝑟𝑙 evolution when these 
MCSs occur and the relative FT are shown in Fig. A.6 and Fig. A.7, respectively. 
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Fig. A.6. (a) 𝑁𝑟𝑙 evolution when simultaneously the safety relief valve fails stuck with 𝑄𝑠𝑓 = 50.5 
(kg/s) and the communication fails; (b) the steam valve fails stuck closed; (c) the PID controller fails 
stuck at 18% of the nominal 𝑄𝑒 that should be provided at 80% 𝑃𝑛. 
 
 
Fig. A.7. Fault Tree for the low level failure mode at high power 
 
APPENDIX 2 
 
Near 
Miss 
𝑇𝑠 𝑀𝑠 𝑂𝑠 𝑇𝑠𝑎 𝑀𝑠𝑎 𝑂𝑠𝑎 𝑇𝑐 𝑀𝑐 𝑂𝑐 𝑇𝑝 𝑀𝑝 𝑂𝑝 
Near 
Miss 
𝑇𝑠 𝑀𝑠 𝑂𝑠 𝑇𝑠𝑎 𝑀𝑠𝑎 𝑂𝑠𝑎 𝑇𝑐 𝑀𝑐 𝑂𝑐 𝑇𝑝 𝑀𝑝 𝑂𝑝 
1. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 1 167. 4 1 3 0 0 0 4 1 2 1 4 1 
2. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 2 168. 4 1 3 0 0 0 4 1 2 2 4 1 
3. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 4 1 169. 4 1 4 2 2 3 1 1 2 1 4 1 
4. 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 4 2 170. 4 1 4 2 2 2 3 1 3 2 4 1 
5. 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 4 1 171. 4 1 4 2 3 3 1 1 2 1 4 1 
6. 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 3 4 2 172. 4 1 4 2 4 2 4 1 3 1 4 1 
7. 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 2 2 4 1 173. 4 1 4 3 2 3 1 1 1 1 4 2 
8. 0 0 0 2 2 2 4 1 3 2 4 1 174. 4 1 3 3 2 2 4 1 4 2 4 1 
9. 0 0 0 2 3 1 4 1 2 4 3 3 175. 4 1 3 3 3 2 0 0 0 1 4 1 
10. 0 0 0 2 4 2 4 1 3 1 4 1 176. 4 1 4 3 3 3 1 1 2 1 4 1 
11. 0 0 0 3 2 3 3 1 2 1 4 1 177. 4 1 4 3 3 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 
12. 0 0 0 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 4 2 178. 4 1 3 3 4 2 0 0 0 1 4 1 
13. 0 0 0 3 3 3 1 1 2 1 4 1 179. 4 1 4 3 4 3 1 1 1 1 4 2 
14. 0 0 0 3 3 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 180. 4 1 4 3 4 3 2 1 2 2 4 1 
15. 0 0 0 3 3 3 2 1 2 2 4 1 181. 4 1 4 3 4 3 3 1 2 1 4 1 
16. 0 0 0 3 3 2 3 1 3 1 4 1 182. 4 1 4 3 4 3 3 1 2 2 4 1 
17. 0 0 0 3 3 2 4 1 3 1 4 1 183. 4 1 3 3 4 2 4 1 4 2 4 1 
18. 0 0 0 3 4 3 1 1 1 2 4 2 184. 4 1 2 4 1 3 0 0 0 1 4 1 
19. 0 0 0 3 4 3 3 1 2 1 4 1 185. 4 1 2 4 1 3 0 0 0 2 4 1 
20. 0 0 0 4 2 2 0 0 0 4 4 1 186. 4 1 3 4 1 4 1 1 1 2 4 2 
21. 0 0 0 4 2 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 187. 4 1 3 4 1 4 2 1 2 1 4 1 
22. 0 0 0 4 2 3 3 1 2 1 4 1 188. 4 1 3 4 1 4 2 1 2 2 4 1 
23. 0 0 0 4 2 3 4 1 2 1 4 1 189. 4 1 3 4 1 4 3 1 2 1 4 1 
24. 0 0 0 4 3 2 0 0 0 1 4 1 190. 4 1 2 4 1 3 4 1 4 1 4 1 
25. 0 0 0 4 3 2 0 0 0 2 4 1 191. 4 1 3 4 1 4 4 1 2 1 4 1 
26. 0 0 0 4 3 3 2 1 1 2 4 2 192. 4 1 2 4 1 3 4 1 4 2 4 1 
27. 0 0 0 4 3 3 3 1 2 2 4 1 193. 4 1 3 4 1 4 4 1 2 3 4 1 
28. 0 0 0 4 3 2 4 1 3 1 4 1 194. 4 1 2 4 2 3 0 0 0 1 4 1 
29. 0 0 0 4 4 2 0 0 0 1 4 1 195. 4 1 3 4 2 4 1 1 1 1 4 2 
30. 0 0 0 4 4 2 0 0 0 2 4 1 196. 4 1 4 4 2 3 1 1 2 1 4 1 
31. 0 0 0 4 4 3 1 1 1 1 4 2 197. 4 1 3 4 2 4 2 1 2 1 4 1 
32. 0 0 0 4 4 3 1 1 2 1 4 1 198. 4 1 4 4 2 3 2 1 1 2 4 2 
33. 0 0 0 4 4 3 1 1 1 2 4 2 199. 4 1 3 4 2 4 2 1 2 2 4 1 
34. 0 0 0 4 4 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 200. 4 1 3 4 2 4 3 1 2 2 4 1 
35. 0 0 0 4 4 3 2 1 1 2 4 2 201. 4 1 2 4 2 3 4 1 4 1 4 1 
36. 0 0 0 4 4 3 3 1 2 3 4 1 202. 4 1 3 4 2 2 4 1 4 1 4 1 
37. 0 0 0 4 4 3 4 1 2 1 4 1 203. 4 1 3 4 2 4 4 1 2 1 4 1 
38. 0 0 0 4 4 3 4 1 2 2 4 1 204. 4 1 2 4 2 4 4 1 3 2 4 1 
39. 1 1 3 1 2 2 1 1 4 1 4 1 205. 4 1 3 4 2 4 4 1 2 2 4 1 
40. 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 1 206. 4 1 4 4 2 2 4 1 3 3 4 1 
41. 2 1 3 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 4 1 207. 4 1 2 4 3 3 0 0 0 1 4 1 
42. 2 1 3 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 4 1 208. 4 1 3 4 3 2 0 0 0 1 4 1 
43. 2 1 2 2 2 3 3 1 4 1 4 1 209. 4 1 4 4 3 3 1 1 1 1 4 2 
44. 2 1 4 2 4 2 2 1 3 1 3 1 210. 4 1 3 4 3 4 1 1 2 1 4 1 
45. 2 1 3 2 4 4 2 1 2 1 4 1 211. 4 1 4 4 3 3 1 1 2 1 4 1 
46. 2 1 3 3 2 4 2 1 2 1 4 1 212. 4 1 3 4 3 4 2 1 2 1 4 1 
47. 2 1 2 3 2 3 4 1 4 1 4 1 213. 4 1 4 4 3 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 
48. 2 1 3 3 3 4 2 1 2 1 4 1 214. 4 1 4 4 3 3 2 1 1 2 4 2 
49. 2 1 2 3 3 3 3 1 4 1 4 1 215. 4 1 3 4 3 4 2 1 2 2 4 1 
50. 2 1 3 3 4 4 1 1 2 1 4 1 216. 4 1 4 4 3 3 2 1 2 2 4 1 
51. 2 1 2 3 4 3 3 1 4 1 4 1 217. 4 1 3 4 3 4 3 1 2 1 4 1 
52. 2 1 3 4 1 4 2 1 2 1 4 1 218. 4 1 3 4 3 4 3 1 2 3 4 1 
53. 2 1 3 4 3 4 1 1 2 1 4 1 219. 4 1 2 4 3 3 4 1 4 1 4 1 
54. 2 1 2 4 3 4 3 1 3 1 4 1 220. 4 1 2 4 3 4 4 1 3 1 4 1 
55. 2 1 2 4 3 4 4 1 3 1 4 1 221. 4 1 3 4 3 2 4 1 4 1 4 1 
56. 2 1 2 4 4 3 0 0 0 1 4 1 222. 4 1 3 4 3 4 4 1 2 1 4 1 
57. 2 2 3 3 4 4 1 1 2 1 4 1 223. 4 1 2 4 3 3 4 1 4 2 4 1 
58. 2 2 3 4 4 4 2 1 2 1 4 1 224. 4 1 3 4 3 4 4 1 2 2 4 1 
59. 3 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 1 225. 4 1 4 4 3 2 4 1 3 2 4 1 
60. 3 1 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 2 226. 4 1 2 4 4 3 0 0 0 2 4 1 
61. 3 1 3 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 4 1 227. 4 1 3 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 4 2 
62. 3 1 3 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 3 1 228. 4 1 4 4 4 3 1 1 1 1 4 2 
63. 3 1 3 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 4 1 229. 4 1 4 4 4 3 1 1 1 2 4 2 
64. 3 1 3 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 4 1 230. 4 1 3 4 4 4 2 1 2 1 4 1 
65. 3 1 4 1 2 3 1 1 2 1 4 1 231. 4 1 4 4 4 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 
66. 3 1 4 2 2 2 2 1 3 2 4 1 232. 4 1 4 4 4 3 2 1 2 2 4 1 
67. 3 1 4 2 2 3 2 1 1 2 4 2 233. 4 1 3 4 4 4 3 1 2 1 4 1 
68. 3 1 3 2 2 2 4 1 4 1 4 1 234. 4 1 4 4 4 3 3 1 2 1 4 1 
69. 3 1 4 2 3 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 235. 4 1 3 4 4 4 3 1 2 3 4 1 
70. 3 1 4 2 4 3 1 1 2 1 4 1 236. 4 1 3 4 4 4 4 1 2 1 4 1 
71. 3 1 4 2 4 2 3 1 3 1 4 1 237. 4 1 4 4 4 2 4 1 3 2 4 1 
72. 3 1 3 3 1 4 2 1 2 1 4 1 238. 4 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 1 
73. 3 1 2 3 1 3 3 1 4 1 4 1 239. 4 2 3 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 4 1 
74. 3 1 3 3 1 4 3 1 2 1 4 1 240. 4 2 3 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 4 2 
75. 3 1 2 3 1 3 4 1 4 1 4 1 241. 4 2 3 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 4 1 
76. 3 1 2 3 2 3 0 0 0 1 4 1 242. 4 2 3 0 0 0 3 1 2 1 4 1 
77. 3 1 3 3 2 4 2 1 2 1 4 1 243. 4 2 3 0 0 0 3 1 2 2 4 1 
78. 3 1 4 3 2 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 244. 4 2 3 0 0 0 4 1 2 1 4 1 
79. 3 1 2 3 2 4 3 1 3 1 4 1 245. 4 2 2 0 0 0 4 1 3 2 4 1 
80. 3 1 3 3 2 4 3 1 2 2 4 1 246. 4 2 3 1 3 2 0 0 0 1 3 1 
81. 3 1 3 3 2 2 4 1 4 1 4 1 247. 4 2 4 2 1 3 2 1 1 2 4 2 
82. 3 1 2 3 3 3 0 0 0 1 4 1 248. 4 2 4 2 3 2 4 1 3 1 4 1 
83. 3 1 4 3 3 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 249. 4 2 3 2 4 2 0 0 0 1 4 1 
84. 3 1 3 3 3 4 3 1 2 1 4 1 250. 4 2 4 3 2 3 1 1 2 1 4 1 
85. 3 1 4 3 3 2 3 1 3 1 4 1 251. 4 2 4 3 2 2 3 1 3 3 4 1 
86. 3 1 3 3 3 2 4 1 4 1 4 1 252. 4 2 3 3 2 2 4 1 4 1 4 1 
87. 3 1 2 3 4 3 0 0 0 1 4 1 253. 4 2 3 3 3 2 0 0 0 1 4 1 
88. 3 1 3 3 4 4 1 1 2 1 4 1 254. 4 2 4 3 3 3 1 1 1 2 4 2 
89. 3 1 4 3 4 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 255. 4 2 4 3 3 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 
90. 3 1 2 3 4 4 3 1 3 1 4 1 256. 4 2 4 3 3 3 3 1 2 1 4 1 
91. 3 1 2 3 4 3 4 1 4 1 4 1 257. 4 2 3 3 3 2 4 1 4 1 4 1 
92. 3 1 3 4 1 4 1 1 1 1 4 2 258. 4 2 4 3 3 2 4 1 3 1 4 1 
93. 3 1 3 4 1 4 2 1 2 1 4 1 259. 4 2 4 3 4 3 1 1 1 1 4 2 
94. 3 1 2 4 1 3 4 1 4 1 4 1 260. 4 2 4 3 4 3 1 1 1 2 4 2 
95. 3 1 3 4 2 4 2 1 2 1 4 1 261. 4 2 4 3 4 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 
96. 3 1 3 4 2 4 2 1 2 2 4 1 262. 4 2 4 3 4 3 3 1 2 1 4 1 
97. 3 1 3 4 2 4 3 1 2 1 4 1 263. 4 2 2 4 1 3 0 0 0 2 4 1 
98. 3 1 3 4 2 4 3 1 2 2 4 1 264. 4 2 3 4 1 4 1 1 1 1 4 2 
99. 3 1 3 4 3 4 1 1 2 1 4 1 265. 4 2 3 4 1 4 3 1 2 1 4 1 
100. 3 1 3 4 3 4 3 1 2 1 4 1 266. 4 2 2 4 1 4 4 1 3 1 4 1 
101. 3 1 3 4 3 4 3 1 2 2 4 1 267. 4 2 2 4 1 3 4 1 4 2 4 1 
102. 3 1 2 4 3 4 4 1 3 2 4 1 268. 4 2 3 4 1 4 4 1 2 2 4 1 
103. 3 1 2 4 4 3 0 0 0 1 4 1 269. 4 2 3 4 2 2 0 0 0 4 4 1 
104. 3 1 3 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 4 2 270. 4 2 3 4 2 4 1 1 1 1 4 2 
105. 3 1 3 4 4 4 2 1 2 1 4 1 271. 4 2 3 4 2 4 1 1 1 2 4 2 
106. 3 1 3 4 4 4 2 1 2 2 4 1 272. 4 2 4 4 2 3 2 1 1 4 4 2 
107. 3 1 3 4 4 4 3 1 2 1 4 1 273. 4 2 4 4 2 3 3 1 2 1 4 1 
108. 3 1 2 4 4 4 4 1 3 1 4 1 274. 4 2 3 4 2 4 3 1 2 2 4 1 
109. 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 1 275. 4 2 3 4 2 4 3 1 2 3 4 1 
110. 3 2 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 2 276. 4 2 2 4 2 3 4 1 4 1 4 1 
111. 3 2 3 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 4 1 277. 4 2 3 4 2 2 4 1 4 1 4 1 
112. 3 2 2 0 0 0 3 1 3 1 4 1 278. 4 2 3 4 2 4 4 1 2 1 4 1 
113. 3 2 2 0 0 0 4 1 3 1 4 1 279. 4 2 4 4 2 3 4 1 2 1 4 1 
114. 3 2 4 1 2 2 1 1 3 1 4 1 280. 4 2 2 4 2 4 4 1 3 2 4 1 
115. 3 2 3 2 3 2 0 0 0 1 4 1 281. 4 2 3 4 3 2 0 0 0 1 4 1 
116. 3 2 4 2 3 1 2 1 2 3 3 3 282. 4 2 3 4 3 2 0 0 0 2 4 1 
117. 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 1 4 1 4 1 283. 4 2 4 4 3 3 1 1 1 1 4 2 
118. 3 2 3 3 1 4 1 1 1 1 4 2 284. 4 2 3 4 3 4 1 1 2 1 4 1 
119. 3 2 2 3 1 3 3 1 4 1 4 1 285. 4 2 4 4 3 3 1 1 2 1 4 1 
120. 3 2 2 3 1 3 4 1 4 1 4 1 286. 4 2 3 4 3 4 2 1 2 1 4 1 
121. 3 2 3 3 2 4 1 1 1 1 4 2 287. 4 2 4 4 3 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 
122. 3 2 4 3 2 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 288. 4 2 3 4 3 4 2 1 1 2 4 2 
123. 3 2 3 3 2 4 3 1 2 1 4 1 289. 4 2 4 4 3 3 2 1 1 2 4 2 
124. 3 2 2 3 3 3 0 0 0 1 4 1 290. 4 2 4 4 3 3 2 1 2 2 4 1 
125. 3 2 3 3 3 2 0 0 0 1 4 1 291. 4 2 4 4 3 3 3 1 2 1 4 1 
126. 3 2 4 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 4 2 292. 4 2 3 4 3 4 3 1 2 2 4 1 
127. 3 2 3 3 3 4 2 1 2 1 4 1 293. 4 2 2 4 3 4 4 1 3 1 4 1 
128. 3 2 4 3 3 3 2 1 2 2 4 1 294. 4 2 3 4 3 4 4 1 2 1 4 1 
129. 3 2 2 3 3 4 3 1 3 1 4 1 295. 4 2 2 4 3 3 4 1 4 2 4 1 
130. 3 2 3 3 3 4 3 1 2 1 4 1 296. 4 2 2 4 3 4 4 1 3 2 4 1 
131. 3 2 4 3 3 2 3 1 3 1 4 1 297. 4 2 4 4 3 3 4 1 2 2 4 1 
132. 3 2 4 3 3 3 3 1 2 1 4 1 298. 4 2 3 4 4 2 0 0 0 1 4 1 
133. 3 2 3 3 3 4 3 1 2 2 4 1 299. 4 2 2 4 4 3 0 0 0 2 4 1 
134. 3 2 2 3 3 3 4 1 4 1 4 1 300. 4 2 3 4 4 2 0 0 0 2 4 1 
135. 3 2 3 3 3 2 4 1 4 1 4 1 301. 4 2 4 4 4 3 1 1 2 1 4 1 
136. 3 2 3 3 4 4 1 1 2 1 4 1 302. 4 2 4 4 4 3 1 1 1 2 4 2 
137. 3 2 3 3 4 4 2 1 2 1 4 1 303. 4 2 3 4 4 4 2 1 2 1 4 1 
138. 3 2 4 3 4 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 304. 4 2 4 4 4 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 
139. 3 2 2 3 4 3 4 1 4 1 4 1 305. 4 2 4 4 4 3 2 1 1 2 4 2 
140. 3 2 2 3 4 3 4 1 4 2 4 1 306. 4 2 3 4 4 4 3 1 2 1 4 1 
141. 3 2 2 4 1 4 3 1 3 1 4 1 307. 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 1 3 1 4 1 
142. 3 2 2 4 1 4 4 1 3 1 4 1 308. 4 2 3 4 4 2 4 1 4 1 4 1 
143. 3 2 3 4 2 4 1 1 2 1 4 1 309. 4 2 4 4 4 2 4 1 3 1 4 1 
144. 3 2 3 4 2 4 3 1 2 1 4 1 310. 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 1 3 2 4 1 
145. 3 2 3 4 2 4 3 1 2 2 4 1 311. 4 2 3 4 4 2 4 1 4 2 4 1 
146. 3 2 2 4 2 3 4 1 4 1 4 1 312. 4 3 3 2 4 2 0 0 0 1 4 1 
147. 3 2 2 4 2 4 4 1 3 1 4 1 313. 4 3 4 2 4 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 
148. 3 2 3 4 3 4 1 1 1 2 4 2 314. 4 3 4 3 3 2 3 1 3 1 4 1 
149. 3 2 2 4 3 4 3 1 3 1 4 1 315. 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 1 2 1 4 1 
150. 3 2 3 4 3 4 3 1 2 1 4 1 316. 4 3 3 3 4 2 0 0 0 1 4 1 
151. 3 2 3 4 4 4 1 1 1 1 4 2 317. 4 3 4 3 4 3 1 1 2 1 4 1 
152. 3 2 3 4 4 4 1 1 2 1 4 1 318. 4 3 3 3 4 2 4 1 4 1 4 1 
153. 3 3 3 2 3 2 4 1 4 1 4 1 319. 4 3 4 3 4 2 4 1 3 1 4 1 
154. 3 3 4 2 4 3 1 1 2 1 4 1 320. 4 3 3 4 3 2 0 0 0 2 4 1 
155. 3 3 4 3 3 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 321. 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 1 2 1 4 1 
156. 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 1 4 1 4 1 322. 4 3 4 4 3 2 4 1 3 2 4 1 
157. 3 3 4 3 4 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 323. 4 3 3 4 4 2 0 0 0 2 4 1 
158. 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 1 2 1 4 1 324. 4 3 4 4 4 3 1 1 1 1 4 2 
159. 4 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 1 325. 4 3 4 4 4 3 1 1 2 1 4 1 
160. 4 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 1 326. 4 3 4 4 4 3 2 1 2 1 4 1 
161. 4 1 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 2 327. 4 3 4 4 4 3 2 1 1 2 4 2 
162. 4 1 3 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 4 1 328. 4 3 4 4 4 3 2 1 2 2 4 1 
163. 4 1 3 0 0 0 2 1 1 2 4 2 329. 4 3 4 4 4 3 3 1 2 1 4 1 
164. 4 1 3 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 4 1 330. 4 3 3 4 4 2 4 1 4 1 4 1 
165. 4 1 3 0 0 0 3 1 2 3 4 1 331. 4 3 3 4 4 2 4 1 4 2 4 1 
166. 4 1 2 0 0 0 4 1 3 1 4 1 332. 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 
 
